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DECONSTRUCTING DERRIDA: 
BELOW THE SURFACE OF DIFFERANCE 
W.T. Jones 
There is perhaps a deeper difference of opinion about Derrida than about most 
contemporary philosophers. Consider, for instance, the following segment of Derridean text, 
which appears to be an answer of sorts to the question that many readers might want to ask, 
"To what does Derrida want to call attention by introducing the neologism di/ferance"? 
[T]his graphic difference (a instead of e), this marked difference between two apparently 
vocal notations, ... remains purely graphic: it is read, or it is written, but it cannot be 
heard. It cannot be apprehended in speech, and ... it also bypasses the order of 
apprehension in general. It is offered by a mute mark, by a tacit monument, I would 
even say by a pyramid, thinking not only of the form of the letter when it is printed as 
a capital. But also of the text in Hegel's Encyclopedia, in which the body of the sign is 
compared to the Egyptian Pyramid. The a of differance, then, is not heard; it remains 
silent, secret, and discreet as a tomb ... 
What is going on here? There will not only be differences of opinion about what is going 
on -- differences in interpretation, that Derrida himself would of course welcome as 
confirmations of his thesis that all texts, including his own, can be variously and endlessly 
deconstructed. There will also be radically different opinions -- which will probably be rather 
less welcome -- about whether what is going on is profoundly significant or merely fancy 
verbal footwork. 
I shall not take sides in this debate, for I do not believe it is possible for either party to 
make a case that will have the least validity for the other. Their underlying assumptions are so 
different that what is convincing evidence for the one, is either irrelevant or trivial for the 
other. In a word, the disagreement between Derrideans and anti-Derrideans is rooted in a deep 
difference in world view and, like all such bipolarizations of opinion, non-terminating1 
This being the case, instead of contributing one more item to a series of inconclusive 
exchanges, I shall take a wholly different tack; I shall describe what I believe are the central 
features of Derrida's world view. In particular, I hope to show, first, Derrida's world view is 
unusual in being marked by an internal conflict, and, second, that the tension generated by this 
conflict is responsible for those features of his view on which opinion is most deeply divided. 
Those are the theses of this paper. I shall support them by doing what I call philosophical 
archaeology on Differance. That is, I shall look below the surface2 of this text to uncover the 
conflicted metaphysical expectations that Derrida brought to the problem he set out to discuss. 
The practice of philosophical archaeology, which I have discussed elsewhere in detail,3 can 
be re-described for the purposes of this paper within the framework of Derridian 
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deconstruction: Derrida himself, exploiting a metaphor of Levy-Strauss', describes a text as 
bricolage, an assembly of bits and pieces derived from other texts, which in their turn are 
assemblages of bricolage derived from still other texts. To deconstruct a text one disassembles 
it back into the bits of bricolage of which it is composed. And these into other bits, 
indefinitely. But Derridean deconstruction stops there, or rather, it continues indefinitely at 
this, always textual, level. 
Philosophical archaeology focuses, instead, on the pattern of interests that led the author of 
the text being deconstructed to assemble just these bits of bricolage and no others into just this 
arrangement and no other. For instance, if one deconstructs descriptions of U.S. interventions 
in Libya, Grenada, and Panama, one finds that the bricolage assembled by most Third World 
writers differs systematically from the bricolage assembled by most First World writers: the 
former contain bits of bricolage -- "imperialism," for instance -- that do not appear in the 
latter, and the latter contains bits -- "terrorism," for instance -- omitted from the former. And 
it is natural, having noted these differences, to read back from them to the very different 
underlying political beliefs and, what are perhaps more important, the deep, inarticulate 
attitudes of the authors of those texts. 
That political, religious and ethnic interests affect the ways in which authors assemble 
bricolage; that it is possible to "read back" from the text to the interests and biases that have 
organized the bricolage in just this rather than any other way; that readers have their own 
interests and that these may be either very similar to or markedly different from the author's 
interests; that, finally, such similarities and dissimilarities account for some disagreements 
amongst readers with regard to the value and importance of a text -- these are matters taken 
for granted by almost everybody, almost all the time. It would be hard to get though a single 
day without constantly trying to read back from what other people say to their interests and 
intentions, either conscious or unconscious. 
But the interests to which most people read back are either fairly obvious psychological 
motivations (greed and vanity, for instance) or fairly glaring ethnic, racial and religious biases, 
like the political biases that are easily detected in Latin American and US press releases on the 
intervention in Panama. Philosophical archaeology assumes, as a working hypothesis, that there 
are metaphysical biases as well and that they function in much the same way that ethnic and 
religious biases functions -- as Wittgensteinian lenses that brings into focus some features of 
the world whilst in effect filtering others out. 
What are some of these metaphysical biases? Just as one can observe in the writing and 
discourse of some people an anti-Catholic bias, matched in the writings of others by a Catholic 
bias, so, one can observe a contrast between on the one hand an underlying presupposition that 
the world is best understood from outside, contemplated at a distance, and on the other hand, a 
presupposition that it is best understood from inside and by becoming actively involved in it. 
And one can observe a contrast between an underlying presupposition that the world is a well-
ordered cosmos and the presupposition that, so far from being a cosmos, it is a jumble, full of 
sound and fury, signifying nothing. Again, as a third example of contrasting metaphysical 
biases, there is the contrast between an expectation that the world is fundamentally 
unproblematic and easily decoded and an expectation that it is deep and that because it is deep 
it can easily be misread. Each person's experience tends, on the whole, to confirm that person's 
3 
metaphysical expectations -- because, as with paranoia, what would disconfirm the expectation 
is simply not noticed. 
Thus, metaphysical bias for the most part takes care of its own -- but at the cost, I 
remark in passing, of generating non-terminating disagreement with those who, because they 
have a different set of biases, encounter a different world. Nevertheless, there can be intra-
personal, as well as interpersonal, conflict. There are, that is, individuals some of whose own 
biases conflict. Because such conflicted biases lead to disconfirming, and so disturbing, 
experiences of the world, such individuals have to find ways of dealing with the conflict. 
Derrida's way, I shall suggest, is to dance. 
What, then, are the conflicted metaphysical expectations that give the bricolage assembled 
into Differance the curious shape (curious, that is, when compared with traditional philosophical 
discourse) that it well represented in the passage cited at the start of this paper? 
I shall begin by saying what I take Differance to be "about" -- a hazardous, not to say 
foolhardy, undertaking with respect to any paper by Derrida. I shall do this by locating 
Differance within the framework of more familiar, but very different, approaches to the 
problem with which Differance is concerned. I shall then deconstruct Derrida's text by 
analyzing a number of phrases and words from his exposition -- from the bricolage he has 
assembled -- and trying to read back from Derrida's choice of just these, instead of other 
possible, bits of bricolage, to the metaphysical beliefs and attitudes that underlie these choices. 
The topic discussed in Differance is, in the broadest sense, the topic that is the chief 
preoccupation of many contemporary philosophers: how to adjust to, how to live in, a world 
without foundations. This is an urgent problem for Derrida because of the solution he proposes 
for the problem of reference. Though there has always been disagreement about what exactly 
words refer to, it has been commonly assumed at least since Plato, that language is somehow 
related to a non-linguistic world, a world that is just whatever it is, independently of language. 
Though some philosophers have held that language is a veil that obscures, interferes with, one's 
access to that world, most have believed that, with practice and discipline, language can be 
improved, purified, so that it adequately reflects that world. Reference became a central, in 
distinction from a relatively peripheral, problem only when proved necessary to abandon all of 
the "easy" solutions, in terms either of transcendental forms or, alternatively, sense data. In this 
situation, deeper divisions amongst philosophers have emerged. Anglo-American philosophers 
still commonly assume that words refer -- they divide only on how, and how firmly language, 
is anchored to that non-linguistic world. 
These Anglo-American preoccupations are by-passed by Derrida, since in his view, il 
n'y a pas d' hors texte -- there is nothing outside language. It does not follow, however, from 
the fact that nothing is outside language, that everything is inside language. At least, in 
Derrida's view this does not follow. For the kinds of disjunctions -- for instance, if not inside, 
then outside -- which have governed the thinking of Western philosophers since Plato and 
Aristotle, and which they one and all have regarded as outside language -- are, according to 
Derrida, inside language. That is to say, we are inevitably embedded in language. And not 
only this. Much more radically, the concept of "we" (alternatively, the concept of "self" or 
"subject"), and the contrasting concept of "world," are themselves examples of this 
embeddedness, elements in what Derrida calls the "logocentric" conceptual scheme that, 
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following Heidegger, he assumes "we" have inherited from the Greeks of Plato's day. It does 
not follow, therefore, that logocentrism and its basic metaphysical categories are "inevitable"; on 
the contrary, the notion of "inevitability," as contrasted with "mere chance," is but another part 
of the baggage of logocentrism. Just as there once was, long ago, a transformation of a non-
logocentric language into a logocentric language, there may well occur some day a 
transformation of logocentrism -- the language in which reference is a problem, the language in 
which "language" and "we" and "world" are fundamental organizing concepts -- into "an entirely 
other language." If this happens it will be "a necessarily violent transformation" (p. 25).4 
But whatever that language may be, it will still be a language; philosophers will 
therefore be as far as ever from "presence," that is, from contact with a world unmediated by 
language. From the fact we cannot escape language and that "in language there are only 
differences without positive terms." [p. II; Derrida is quoting Saussure] What follows? I will first 
quote Derrida's answer and then try to deconstruct it into non-Derridian language. 
The first consequence to be drawn from this is that the signified concept is never 
present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. ... every 
concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to 
other concepts, by means of a systematic play of differences. Such play, differance. is 
thus no longer simply a concept ... [nor is it] simply a word, that is, what is generally 
represented as the calm, present, and self -referential unity of concept and phonic 
material. (p. 11) 
To say that "in language there are only differences" is, more or less, to say that all terms refer, 
and inevitably refer, only ambiguously. A term's referent, no matter how skillfully one tries to 
bound and confine it, is an indefinitely expanding open set. 
The opening moves (pp. 1-2) Derrida makes in Truth in Painting illustrate this thesis. 
Someone, not me, comes and says the words: "I am interested in the idiom in 
painting." ... You are not completely in the dark, but what does he mean exactly? 
Does he mean that he is interested in the idiom "in painting," in the idiom itself, 
for its own sake ... but what is an idiom? 
That he is interested in the idiomatic expression itself? ... 
That he is interested in ... what pertains to the idiom, the idiomatic trait or 
style ... in the domain of painting ... ? ... 
Which makes, if you count them well, at least four hypotheses; but each one 
divides again, is grafted and contaminated by all the others, and you would never be 
finished translating them. 
Nor will I. 
Thus it is only a dream of foundationists that there are rigid designators (to misappropriate 
a term of Kripke's and, by doing so, to illustrate Derrida's thesis, inasmuch as I have just 
introduced a novel reference for "rigid designator," thereby demonstrating that "rigid designator" 
is not an unqualifiedly rigid designator.) 
Without pausing to evaluate Derrida's account of reference as open-ended, I shall ask what 
stance Derrida adopts, and what stance he recommends that others adopt, toward his discovery 
that language floats -- his discovery that the terms in which metaphyscians since Plato have 
posed the questions they want to ask about the world -- is it one? is it many? is it mind-
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dependent or mind-independent? and so on -- do not refer to the world but only to other 
terms, in an ever expanding circle of possible meanings. 
Derrida's position seems to be this: We should cease looking for "the" meaning of a 
(any) term, for there is only a hole, an emptiness, where most people, including most scientists, 
expect to find a determinate meaning. Though this thesis apparently applies quite generally to 
all terms alike, Derrida concentrates on the alleged emptiness of metaphysical terms, Derrida 
does not conclude, as genuinely anti-foundationist philosophers have done, that one ought to 
abandon metaphysics and turn one's attention to other matters. Rather, we should endlessly 
track the endless, and ever expanding, circle of the referents of metaphysical terms. 
Alternatively put, we should continue metaphysical inquiry, but continue it as "play:" We 
should follow "the play of dijferance" through and around the bits of bricolage that survive 
from earlier attempts by metaphysicians to provide determinate answers to the traditional 
foundationist questions about the world. 
Since "play" is a bit of bricolage that occurs repeatedly in Dijferance, I will in my turn 
introduce a bit of bricolage -- from "The End of Man," which is itself a bit of bricolage from 
Zarathustra. Nietzsche, Derrida says, distinguished between the merely superior man and the 
overman. 
The first is abandoned to his distress in a last moment of pity. The latter ... awakens and 
leaves without turning back to what he leaves behind him. He burns his text and erases 
the traces of his steps. His laughter will then burst out.. .. He will dance .... (pp. 135-6) 
On my reading of Nietzsche, overman's laughter and dance reflect Nietzsche's own joyful 
response to his discovery that, because reference is open-ended, the pursuit of determinate 
meanings is futile. Nietzsche and his overman were exhilarated, liberated, when they came to 
realize that texts refer only to texts, not to a world beyond all texts. 
I shall support this reading of Nietzsche by two more bits of bricolage, one from "The 
Vision of the Loneliest" in Zarathustra, the other from "Homer's Conquest." In the former, 
Zarathustra sees a young shepherd, who is "writhing, gagging, in spasms, his face distorted, and 
a heavy black snake hung out of his mouth." Zarathustra cries out to him, "Bite! Bite its head 
off! Bite!" 
The shepherd ... bit with a good bite. Far away he spewed the head of the snake -- and 
he jumped up. No longer shepherd, no longer human -- one changed, radiant, 
laughing! 
In the latter, this metaphor is unpacked. The black snake is the recognition that God is 
dead, that the world has no goal and no direction, that everthing eternally returns. Overman is 
simply 
the truly exuberant, alive and world-affirming man who does not merely resign himself 
to and learn to get along with [this truth], but who wants everything as it was and is 
back again, back forever and ever, insatiably calling da capo, not only to himself but to 
the whole spectacle and performance .... 
I have introduced these bits of Nietzschean bricolage here in order to bring out, by way of 
contrast, how very differently play functions in Derrida's own response to what they both take 
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to be the inevitable indeterminacy of reference. Where Nietzsche is liberated by this discovery 
and "burns his text" as being a useless incumberance, Derrida not only preserves it but endlessly 
re-reads it. Where Nietzsche "erases the traces of his steps," Derrida continuously tracks them. 
Nietzsche and Derrida are both relativists; that they are follows, in the case of each of 
them, from the fact that the nature of language renders rigid designation impossible. Nietzsche 
would agree with Derrida that the "Being" endlessly debated by the traditional metaphysicians is 
only a hole. But Nietzsche does not notice the hole; he laughs and dances because he has been 
liberated from metaphysics. Derrida has not been liberated; he is still very much a 
metaphysician, aware, therefore, of the hole; he dances around it -- tracks the answers of 
earlier metaphysicians -- in order to avoid looking into the emptiness where, as he believes, 
Being ought to be but where, as he is convinced, it is not. 
In a word, Nietzsche is a happy relativist; that is why his laughter, as I read it, is joyous. 
Derrida is an unhappy relativist, a relativist malgre lui, who wishes things were different but 
who is persuaded that they cannot be. That is why Derridean word-play, as I read it, is so very 
different from Nietzsche's. It is a form of therapy; it is designed to relieve people from the 
anxiety they feel whenever they attend to the fact that there is only a hole where rigid 
metaphysical designators ought to be. The therapy is in effect a dance around the hole -- a 
dance intended to be so entertaining, so light and swift, (the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this paper is a good example of a Derridean dance) that both Derrida and his readers alike are 
quite distracted from any desire to have any philosophical question -- for instance, the 
question, what is Derrida's theory of reference -- definitively answered. In a word, the text of 
Differance does not tackle -- does not try to solve, however indirectly, tangentially or allusively 
-- any philosophical problem; it illustrates how Derrida proposes that all philosophical problems 
be dealt with -- by assembling the failed answers of earlier philosophers and then dancing 
around them. 
Is Derrida a foundationist or an anti-foundationist? If one reads the text of Differance 
at the surface level only, the answer is so obvious that it must seem silly to raise the question: 
he is a radical anti-foundationist; that is the whole thrust of everything he says about the 
intrinsic indeterminacy of reference. However, if ones looks below the surface -- if one reads 
sub-textually -- things look very different. 
Foundationist thinking has been dominated at least since Plato by an unconscious 
adoption of what I shall call the aU-or-none rule, which excludes the possibility of there being 
anything, x, that is better than something else, y, unless there is something that is best, and 
excludes as well the possibility of any proposition being truer than any other proposition unless 
there is at least one proposition that is absolutely true. 
The argument about measurement in The Phaedo has this aU-or-none form: either there is 
an absolute criterion of equality or no comparative judgments of distance, size, or volume are 
possible; that being an absurd conclusion, it follows that there is an absolute criterion of 
equality. And it underlies the opening moves in The Republic, which sketch the overall strategy 
of the dialogue. The unstated assumption is the ali-or-none rule: the only alternative to the use 
of force to control societies is rational persuasion, the possibility of which depends on the 
existence of forms. Since it is taken for granted that no one will opt for a society ruled by 
force, it follows that the forms exist. 
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Similarly with the Cartesians: either there is something (which turns out to be my own 
existence) that is indubitable or all is dubitable. So, too, with the Logical Positivists, who in 
other respects are unlikely bedfellows of the Platonists and Cartesians. Though sentences about 
the physical world are not anchored in the forms (which are dismissed as unverifiable) nor in 
self -evident rules (which are dismissed as tautologies), they are anchored -- in protocol 
sentences that report unit sensory experiences -- and just as firmly anchored as they are 
anchored for Platonists and Cartesians. That they might not be anchored was never seriously 
considered by the Positivists, who, like other foundationists, assume, by the ali-or-none rule, 
that the alternative to being securely anchored is too dreadful to contemplate -- it is to be 
hopelessly adrift on the sea of scepticism. 
Philosophers whose thought does not move along these lines who are anti-foundationists, 
are rare indeed. Hume, a professed "mitigated sceptic," is one of these exceptions, and an 
interesting one. For his "impressions," though they have a superficial family resemblance to the 
Positivists' protocol sentences, function very differently. He did not use them to try to anchor 
the sciences; he was quite content if the sciences floated, because he thought of them as being 
"human," and having "a direct reference to action and society" (Enquiry. xii, pt. iii). 
I believe that, in these terms, Derrida is neither a foundationist nor yet an anti-
foundationist. He is conflicted about, radically ambivalent to, the ali-or-none rule. He 
alternates between adopting the "all", or foundationist, option and the "none", or unmitigated 
sceptical, option. 
That this is the case with Derrida is perhaps not immediately obvious from the text of 
Differance. A clearer -- indeed, a paradigmatic -- example is the three-paper exchange with 
Searle. It consists of (1) Derrida's "Signature Event Context," which is a criticism of an 
argument of Austin's; (2) Searle's "Reiterating the Difference: A Reply to Derrida" which argues 
that Derrida has misunderstood Austin; and (3) Derrida's "Limited Inc," which is an attack on 
Searle. There is a extraordinary contrast in style and in tone between (1) and (3): The former is 
serious; the latter is playful. In the former Derrida is embarked on the kind of cognitive 
inquiry that Searle is embarked on in (2), the kind of inquiry that Anglo-American philosophers 
commonly undertake. In (1) Derrida and in (2) Searle, that is to say, both assume that that 
philosophical terms designate sufficiently rigidly for a careful reader to ascertain what an 
author means, and in particular they assume that Austin's How to Do Things with Words refers 
to the events that Austin calls "speech acts." That being the case, the question is whether 
Austin got it wrong about speech acts, as Derrida maintains, or right, as Searle maintains. In 
(3) Derrida does not reply by undertaking to show that he is right about Austin being mistaken. 
On the contrary, reverting to his official position that all reference is open-ended -- there is 
only a hole where Austin and Searle naively expect to find something referred to by "speech 
act" -- he abandons the project, launched in (1), of discovering what speech acts are and takes 
to dancing around Searle and Searle's paper, starting out, for instance, by listing all the quite 
unwarranted assumptions Searle had made when he copyrighted the manuscript of (2), which he 
had sent to Derrida for comment. 
This confrontation between Derrida and Searle is typical of world view disagreements. 
From Searle's point of view, Derrida changed the rules of the game as soon as he realized that 
by the rules they had adopted in (1) and (2) he had lost the game. Searle did not reply to (3) 
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by dancing about Derrida's dance . Searle was probably an unpracticed dancer and must have 
felt anyway that he did not want to win a dancing competition; he therefore had no option save 
silence. From Derrida's point of view, he has demonstrated once again that philosophers cannot 
answer questions; they can only cite the unwarranted assumptions made by other philosophers in 
the course of seeking answers. 
But I have introduced this exchange less to illustrate the non-terminating nature of world 
view disagreements than to provide some guidelines for uncovering what is below the surface of 
Differance. At various points in that essay Derrida ceases to dance; he becomes serious. At 
these points he is either making cognitive claims that are at variance with his Saussurean view 
of reference as necessarily open-ended or he is expresssing regret that the Saussurean position 
excludes the possibility of there being a "kingdom" of closed-ended reference. I focus on these 
points because I believe one can read back from them to fissures in Derrida's world view. I 
hold -- to anticipate the conclusion I am going to propose -- that a sub-textual reading of this 
bricolage shows that the therapy Derrida has proposed for coping in a world without 
foundations has not, even in his own case, been wholly successful. 
Consider, as a start, these three bits of bricolage: 
"strange space" (p. 5) 
"bottomless chessboard" (p. 22) 
"irreparable loss" (p.19) 
The space discussed here is between "speech and writing"; the chessboard is the empirical world 
in which most people believe they conduct their traffic with nature and other men and women; 
the loss is the loss of "presence," that is, the failure to make contact with an unmediated, non-
linguistic reality. 
But why "strange"? why "bottomless"? why "irreparable"? What does Derrida's choice of 
these adjectives suggest about his world view? They reveal, I think, disappointed metaphysical 
expectations: it is only when one is expecting a familiar space and encounters an unusual one 
that one calls it "strange." And so, even more evidently, for "bottomless' and "irreparable". 
Since there is a close correlation between the level of one's expectation and the intensity of the 
disappointment one experiences if that expectation is defeated, a really radical reversal of 
expectations is reflected in these adjectives. It is not merely a matter of Derrida having been 
handed a partially filled glass when he expected one that was brimming full; it's rather a matter 
of his finding that, as he was bringing the glass to his lips, it wholly disappeared. 
In a word, Derrida must at some time have had high metaphysical expectations -- the usual 
expectations of the philosophical tradition, from the Platonists to the Cartesians and beyond --
that firm foundations for metaphysical beliefs can be found. Morever, in Derrida's text there is 
not merely disappointment that the world does not live up to his high expectations for it; there 
is also nostalgia for the lost world5 that would have corresponded to those expectations. 
Consider, for instance, 
Not only is there no kingdom of differance, but differance instigates the subversion of 
everything within us that desires a kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening and 
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infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future 
presence of a kingdom (22). 
At a purely textual level what is being alluded to by "kingdom" is what is referred to by 
such expressions as "form of the good" in a Platonic vocabulary; by "self" in a Cartesian, and by 
"absolute" in a Hegelian vocabulary: the notion of a terminus, something toward which 
cognitive and moral inquiry is directed, and on which when it is reached, inquiry can end. 
Why then did Derrida prefer "kingdom" to these other terms? Because, read subtextually, 
"kingdom" suggests, as the others do not, a security that is at best only conditional, not 
unqualified: security for those who dwell in the kingdom but confined to them. Outside is 
insecurity; the barbarian, for all one knows, may be at the gate. And, this is the point, even 
the limited security of a kingdom is denied us. For there is no kingdom -- no possibility of 
determinate reference. There is only differance, and "differance is not" (p. 21). Because 
differance is not, "the domination of beings" -- that is to say, all that is -- "shake[s] as a 
whole, ... tremble[s] in entirety." The world, so far from having secure foundations, is 
seismically unstable.6 
No wonder, then, that "everything within us that desires a kingdom" finds this situation 
"obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded" (p. 22). However inclusive or restricted Derrida's 
"us" may be, he has certainly included himself amongst these shaken people. That he has done 
so is evidence, I suggest, that he is a not entirely happy dancer. He is a dancer faulte de 
mieux, a dancer who dances less because he delights in dancing than because he finds himself to 
be at the edge of the abyss of indefinite, infinitely expanding reference. 
Support for this subtextual reading is to be found in still another bit of bricolage, this 
one an observation about names: "There will be no unique name, even if it were the name of 
Being" (p. 27). That there is no unique name is just a restatement of the already familiar, and 
thoroughly elaborated, proposition to the effect that in language "there are no positive terms" (p. 
11), i.e., no terms that unambiguously refer. What is interesting is that when, as is the case 
here, he is thinking of the application of the doctrine of differance specifically to the term 
"Being," -- the term that it has been reserved by generations of philosophers since Plato as the 
name of the foundation of foundations -- he feels called upon to add the warning, "we must 
think this thought without nostalgia." It is painful enough (this is the subtext of the bricolage 
of p, 11) to discover that the terms by which beings are thought to be named, whether in 
ordinary, or in scientific discourse, so far from referring to horses, dogs, galaxies and neurons, 
they refer to an indefinitely expanding textual field, an abyss about which one can only dance. 
But the shaking and trembling that this discovery causes is as nothing as compared with the 
shaking and trembling experienced when one realizes that the term "Being" is itself unstable. 
Hence a warning is especially called for here: faced with the discovery that "Being" names 
nothing, that it is a "myth," "we" must resist nostaliga for the "lost native country of thought." 
Instead, we "must affirm this [discovery] with a certain laughter and a certain step of the 
dance" (p. 27). 
Who is being warned here? As with the "us" of the passage on p. 22, tone and the context 
certainly suggest that Derrida includes himself amongst those needing a warning. And, since 
one hardly issues warnings to those one believes are not prone to experiencing nostalgia, it is 
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surely not unreasonable to conclude that the subtext here expresses Derrida's own nostalgia. 
Possibly Derrideans will argue that Derrida himself does not experience nostalgia; his "we's" 
and "us's" are mere rhetorical ploys designed to suggest to the nostalgic that he shares their 
sentiment. Perhaps -- if these were the only bits of bricolage available. But they are not. 
Hence, though the deconstruction of other Derridean texts is beyond the scope of this paper, I 
will once again introduce a bit of bricolage from another text, because in it Derrida identifies 
himself quite explicitly and in a particularly revealing way with the sentiments that, as I 
believe, also form the subtext of Differance. 
This bricolage is the conclusion of Structure, Sign, and Play. He has just distinguished 
"two interpretations of interpretation" which are "irreducible," and "absolutely irreconcilable, 
even if, together, they share the field which we call the human sciences" (p. 265). One of these 
modes of interpretation aims, and aims naively, at determinate reference; it "seeks to decipher, 
dreams of deciphering, a truth or an origin which is free from freeplay" (p. 264).7 The second 
mode of interpretation has abandoned this dream because since the structures on which analysis 
terminates have a history and an origin, "the origin of a new structure [must be conceived] on 
the model of catastrophe -- an overturning of nature in nature, a natural interruption of the 
natural sequence, a brushing aside of nature" (p. 263). In other words, it recognizes that no 
terms, not even the scientific vocabulary of structuralism, are, or can be, rigid designators. 
This second mode of interpretation therefore "affirms freeplay and tries to pass beyond man and 
humanism." 
What is Derrida's attitude toward this mode of interpretation? After noting that such 
terms as "gestation," "conception," and "labor" are appropriate for describing it, he comments: 
I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the business of childbearing -- but 
also with a glance toward those who, in a company from which I do not exclude myself, 
turn their eyes away in the face of the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself 
and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the 
species of the non-species, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of 
monstrosity. (p. 265) 
This company, in which Derrida explicity includes himself -- there is no possibly ambiguous 
"we" or "us" here -- is the company that has also been instructed that it "must affirm" that the 
term "Being" names nothing (see above, p. 00). Taking these bits of bricolage together and 
noting that Derrida's italicization suggests resistance that has to be overcome, it seems not 
unreasonable to conclude that his attitude toward the absence of foundations is at the furtherest 
extreme from what Derrida rightly calls "Nietzschean affirmation -- the joyous affirmation of 
the freeplay of a world and without truth, without origin, offered to an active interpretation .. 
II (p, 264). 
In such bits of bricolage as these one does not have to read subtextually to find the 
nostalgia; it is at the surface, recognized and acknowledged by Derrida the author. But with 
these overt expressions of nostalgia for foundationism as clues, one can find evidence of 
nostalgia below the surface at many points -- indeed, as I shall argue, wherever, as in the 
passages (p. 11 and p. 22) that I quoted earlier -- the tone is serious, not playful as it is in 
those sentences about pyramids and tombs quoted at the start of this paper. There, and usually 
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in Differance, he is in control; dancing, it seems, proves to be good therapy -- he dances as 
gaily as ever Nietzsche did. But now and then the therapy fails; he becomes aware of the hole 
about which he is dancing and, overcome by a nostalgia for closure, for completeness, he ceases 
to dance and becomes in effect a traditional metaphysician seeking -- and even finding! --
answers to questions which, when he is in his usual, anti-foundationist stance, he holds to be 
unanswerable. This kind of change in tone from playfulness to seriousness occurs at several 
other points in the essay -- whenever (as I suggest) he allows himself to contemplate, head-on, 
the consequences for foundationism of the Saussurean view of language. At these points the 
abyss proves not to be quite empty: there is, after all, a hors-texte. 
Consider, for instance, one of the numerous mentions of "traces," i.e., evidence in beings 
of the presence of Being. The problem of reference is once again raising its ugly head; restated 
in terms of "traces," it amounts to asking how one can find, within language, traces of what, 
because it is beyond language, anchors language. The difficulty, as Derrida sees, is that this 
seems to raise a question about origins, and since, from his point of view, the very notion of 
origin entails the notion of effect, has he not, he asks himself, committed himself to still 
another of those dialectially related pairs which are supposedly no more than features of the 
logocentric vocabulary we have all inherited? In a word, as Derrida recognizes, the name 
"origin" no longer "suits" what he wants to talk about. How can he extricate himself from "the 
closure of this framework"? How can he extricate himself from this pair of interpretative 
concepts in which his thinking about presence is embedded? His answer is 
I have attempted to indicate a way out ... via the "trace," which is no more an effect than 
it has a cause, but which in and of itself, outside its text, is not sufficient to operate the 
necesssary transgression. (p. 12) 
Here Derrida is no longer playful; he is serious. He is no longer dancing at the edge of the 
abyss; he is making two positive metaphysical claims: First, that there is, after all, evidence of 
there being something in the abyss; it has left a trace that marks its presence. Second, though 
there is enough of a trace to warrant a belief in an extra-linguistic reality, it is not enough of a 
trace to undermine -- to "transgress" -- Derrida's fundamental thesis that, given the nature of 
language, there can be no determinate reference. 
What is one to make of this claim? Though one can agree that "effect" may not be quite 
the right category under which to classify traces, it is surely the case that a trace, in order to be 
a trace, must be a mark, itself accessible, of something no longer accessible but once accessible. 
The trace may be faint; it may be fugitive; it may be ambiguous. But however ambiguous, 
however uncertain the reference, it must, if it is a trace, refer to something. 
Derrida's position seems not unlike that of the woman who claimed her baby was too 
small to be illegitimate. One is inclined to reply that at the moment the baby becomes so tiny 
that it ceases to be illegitimate (at the point at which it ceases to be a "transgression," just at 
that point it ceases to be a baby. Mutatis mutandis for traces. 
Further, while Derrida's trace is obviously inside the text in which it occurs, is it a trace 
of something inside some other text; or is it a trace of "presence," i.e. something outside all 
texts? If inside, the notion of trace is unproblematic, but useless for Derrida inasmuch as the 
trace is not a trace of what is extra-textual, but only of another bit of textual bricolage. If 
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outside, there is indeed the possibility that the text is a sign of what is beyond all texts, but 
only at the cost of another "transgression." 
How might Derrida reply? Paul Mann has suggested to me (in a personal communication) 
that "trace" is to be understood in Lacanian terms, as "an empty referent -- there is not nor was 
there ever any actual content latent in the unconscious to which the trace refers ... for 
Lacanians the signifier is the sign of a Lack ... " This seems to me a perspicuous reading of 
Derrida, but we have to distinguish a question of interpretation (What does Derrida mean by 
"trace"?) from the relevant question here: Does this notion of trace work? Does it escape "the 
closure of the framework?" 
It is clear I think, that it does not. So far as Derrida adopts the orthodox reading of 
Freud he gives us an unproblematic notion of "trace," but one that it is not the "way out" which 
he sought, since the trace, so understood, is the marker of an earlier episode in the patient's 
life, which may be recovered by psychoanalysis, i.e., something hors texte. So far, on the other 
hand, as he adopts a Lacanian reading, he explains one enigma by appeal to another enigma. I 
suspect that, if the notion of "trace" works for Derrida and the Derridians it does so because of 
an unnoticed ambiguity between Lacanian and the orthodox interpretations of Freud; if one 
moves rapidly enough from one interpretation to the other, one avoids noticing the 
contradiction. It is doubtless easy for Derrida and the Derrideans not to notice contradictions 
because for them, of course, the law of contradiction is one more piece of logocentric baggage. 
Thus, later in Differance, he observes that "one can think without a contradiction, or at least 
without granting any pertinence to such a contradiction, what is perceptible and imperceptible 
in the trace .... Heidegger can therefore, in a contradiction without contradiction, consign, 
countersign, the sealing of the trace" (pp. 24-5). 
This seems to amount to saying that one can both remember and at the same time forget 
that the trace is a trace. Whether this kind of "active forgetting" (as Derrida calls it) is a 
psychological possibility is one thing -- given the spiritual exercises of the Jesuits and the 
"double think" described by Orwell in 1984, or given for that matter the amount of muddled-
mindedness loose in the world -- it would be naive to rule out active forgetting as a procedure 
by which one can learn to believe conflicting propositions. 
But to recognize this possibility does not eliminate the "pertinence" of the contradiction; it 
is merely to say that some individuals can learn to avoid thinking about the pertinence of a 
contradiction, that is, that double-think is an alternative therapy for dealing with anxieties 
aroused by one's recognition that the world lacks foundations. 
But the most striking venture into metaphysics occurs, not surprisingly, just after the 
warning against nostalgia, when, clearly, he is thinking of how very, very empty the abyss is: 
From the vantage of this affirmation foreign to all dialectics, the other side of nostalgia, 
what I will call Heideggerian hope, comes into question. I am not unaware how 
shocking this word might seem here. Nevertheless I am venturing it, without excluding 
any of its implications. 
These sentences introduce a long quotation from Heidegger, and the essay then concludes with 
the following comment: 
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Such is the question: the alliance of speech and Being in the unique word, in the finally 
proper name. And such is the question in the simulated affirmation of differance. It 
bears (on) each member of this sentence: "Being I speaks I always and everywhere 1 
throughout I language." (p. 27) 
There is nothing playful about this prose; Derrida is making a metaphysical claim --
stating what he holds to be the case -- about the world. What is the claim? That those who 
have just been warned againt nostalgia, warned against regret for the loss of the kingdom, 
nevertheless have grounds for hope that there is a kingdom after all. And not only grounds for 
hope: there is evidence ("Being speaks") in every sentence uttered or written. Thus, these 
comments on Heideggerian hope not only unsay the immediately preceding warning against 
nostalgia; they unsay the central thesis of Differance, namely, that there is nothing hors-texte. 
At the cost of digressing into one more Derridean text I shall point out still another, and 
quite remarkable, shift on the subject of the abyss. At the end of Differance, as we have just 
seen, Derrida slips into a Heideggerian view of the abyss. So far from the abyss being empty, 
Being speaks from it -- speaks to all who will but "hearken" to its voice. Ten years later, in 
The Truth in Painting he imposes on Heidegger a Derridean view of the abyss: it is quite empty. 
If there is anything clear about Heidegger it is that he held that Being speaks in paintings and 
other works of art (Heidegger's chief example was a painting of old shoes by Van Gogh) and, 
more generally in language, which, for Heidegger, as for Derrida, is an abyss. But for 
Heidegger, unlike Derrida, the abyss of language is not bottomless. For instance, as he wrote in 
the short paper Language, if we fall into the abyss of language 
we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall upward, to a height. Its loftiness opens 
up a depth. The two span a realm in which we would like to become at home, so as to 
find a dwelling place for the life of man (pp. 191-2). 
Nothing, one would have thought, could be more explicit. Yet in The Truth in Painting, which 
purports to be an exposition of The Origin of the Work of Art, this Heideggerian abyss is 
emptied and brought into alignment with what may be called the official Derridean doctrine. 
So far from the depth opening up to a height, it is bottomless, and because it is bottomless one 
can save oneself from falling into the abyss only "by weaving and folding back the cloth to 
infinity" (p. 37) -- that is, not by hearkening to the voice of Being, but by dancing, by tracking 
the indefinitely expanding network of always partial, always indeterminate, references 
accumulated in other, earlier, philosophical texts. 
How does it come about that in the last pages of Differance Derrida makes a long move in 
the direction of Heidegger: the Derridean abyss is not quite empty, whereas in The Truth in 
Painting, Heidegger's abyss becomes Derridean, "bottomless" after all? I suggest that these shifts 
-- of Derrida himself in the direction of Heidegger and then of Derrida's Heidegger in the 
direction of Derrida, reflect a marked ambivalence toward foundationism. 
I have now cited a number of passages, in Differance and in related essays, in which 
Derrida shows himself to be enough of a foundationist to want to make metaphysical claims. 
These are just the points at which nostalgia is expressed (sometimes openly, sometimes 
covertly), as he comes to realize that, despite all his ingenuity, despite all his twistings and 
turnings, his Saussurean view of reference invalidates these claims. It follows, if this 
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deconstruction of Di/ferance is persuasive, that Derrida had by no means escaped from the "old 
debate full of metaphysical investments" (p.21) -- at least not as late as 1978, when The Truth 
in Painting was published. As of that date and contrary to his belief that he had liberated 
himself from metaphysics, he was deeply in debt and unobtrusively making payments on 
account, in the hope, it would seem, of staving off a visit from the bailiff. 
Was the debt subsequently paid off? One's answer to this question will in large measure 
turn on whether one believes there are two Derridas, an earlier Derrida and a later, quite 
different Derrida. That is an issue that has been much, and inconclusively, debated8, and I 
certainly do not propose to try to adjudicate it. Instead, since there is also a difference of 
opinion amongst Wittgensteinians about how much of a break there is between the Tractatus and 
the Investigations, and since Wittgenstein's thought, as much as Derrida's, is driven by the need 
to cope with metaphysicial anxiety, I shall conclude with a few remarks about the differences 
between their approaches. 
When Derrida, instead of finding a kingdom of determinate references, discovered only an 
abyss at his feet, the therapy he undertook was linguistic, a dance around the abyss. The 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus also experienced metaphysical anxieties, because, as he put it, he 
had discovered that "all that happens and is the case is accidental" (6.41 ). The strategy he 
proposed, like Derrida's, was linguistic. But it was not a dance around the gaping hole that 
marked the site of unanswerable metaphysical questions. It was an act of linguistic exorcism. 
He denied that metaphysical questions exist: "For [he assured himself] doubt can exist only 
where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where 
something can be said" (6.51). 
But recitation of this incantation, which was the most he was capable of in the 
Tractatus, was not enough to allay doubt; it proved necessary to show, not merely to say, that 
there are no metaphysical questions. For a time he therefore abandoned philosophical inquiry, 
and when he returned to it, it was in order to take up, one after another, traditional 
metaphysical puzzles, with the intention in each case of showing it to be the product of 
linguistic confusion. When a philosopher -- Augustine, for instance -- asks "What is time?" and 
is distressed because he cannot answer, the reason is that in this question language is spinning. 
The solution is to put language back into traction by employing it in the practical, getting-and-
spending language games of everyday life ("What time does the flight leave?"), where use 
determines meaning. This he undertook to do in the Investigations. The therapy practiced 
there is still linguistic, but it is very different from Derrida's, being designed not (as with 
Derrida) to distract attention from an abyss, but to demonstrate that there is no abyss from 
which one must distract oneself. 
That there is no abyss is doubtless something that must be demonstrated again and again, 
for language all too easily slips out of traction and begins spinning. But, whenever a Derridean 
abyss seems to yawn at one's feet, one can always dissipate it by putting language back into 
traction. The trouble with Derrida from Wittgenstein's point of view is that he never even tries 
to put language back into traction. His prescription -- using metaphysical language, as he 
thinks, playfully -- is no solution. For it is not playful; it is still metaphysical, still spinning. 
And as it spins, it generates a Derridean abyss even as at the moment when, according to 
Derrida, it is suppposed to be distracting us from it. 
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The contrast between these two approaches is instructive, and it is highly relevant to the 
"deep difference of opinion" about Derrida on which I remarked at the beginning of this paper. 
Much of this difference turns on varying responses to Derrida's conflicted, on-again, off -again 
attitude toward the all-or-none rule. Most philosophers, as I have said, have not only taken this 
rule for granted; they have, almost all of them, opted for the "all" alternative. That is to say, 
almost all philosophical theory-construction has been driven by a very low tolerance for 
cognitive and moral dissonance, by the need of the theorists for a universe in which they can 
feel comfortable, but which they can contemplate at a distance, themselves uninvolved and 
uncommitted. It is evident, then, why foundationists would derogate Differance: it challenges 
their deepest beliefs and undermines their security. 
But anti-foundationist philosophers -- those who, like Hume, Dewey and Wittgenstein, 
reject the ali-or-none rule -- are as deeply offended by Differance as the foundationalists, for 
they too take cognition seriously. It is just that, unlike Derrida and the foundationists, they 
hold serious cognitive and moral inquiry to be possible in a world without foundations. From 
their point of view, Derrida, like Wordworth's pale rationalist, devotes himself to multiplying 
metaphysical distinctions, thereby justifying to himself his failure to tackle any real-life 
problems. 
It is as if Derrida wants to be absolutely certain of eliminating every rat that happens to 
be roaming around the house before he starts to hunt any rat down. Since, unlike the 
foundationists, he believes there to be an indefinitely large number of rat holes, none of which 
can be completely blocked, he spends his time pointing out how earlier rat-hunters failed to 
block holes completely. In contrast, the anti-foundationists -- Dewey, for instance -- are 
sceptical about the claim that there are unstoppable rat holes and still more sceptical that there 
is an indefinitely large number of them. "Wait and see" and "Time will tell" are their mottos: 
they propose to turn their attention to stopping rat holes only after they see rats escaping 
through them. Meanwhile they pursue every rat they encounter. That they do so follows from 
the fact that each of them, in his own way, regards the quest for certainty as a form of mental 
illness. 
The pattern of world view biases that leads to admiration for Derrida is quite different. 
People who share Derrida's nostalgia for the lost kingdom and his ambivalence toward 
foundationism -- and I believe many do -- will probably resonate with the passages in 
Differance on Heideggerian hope and on traces: Derrida will seem to them to offer a way out of 
relativism, scepticism, and pragmatism -- a way of enjoying metaphysical cake without having 
actually to eat it. 
Those who read the remarks on nostalgia differently from the way I read them, and who 
therefore miss the ambivalence that I detect, will view Derrida as having deployed weapons for 
as sweeping an attack on Western culture as have been assembled since Nietzsche. For, viewed 
in this way, Derridean deconstruction does not merely mark the end of philosophy (an event 
few non-philosophers would deeply regret). It also marks the end of the enterprise that has 
characterized the West since the Renaissance -- inquiry into the nature of the hors-texte world. 
Inasmuch as Derridean deconstruction is a broom that sweeps away beings as well as Being, it 
has a great appeal for all those critical of what they see as the "pretensions" of the natural and 
social sciences and of the economic, social, political, and literary establishments based upon 
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them. 
Two, from many possible, examples: The Women's Movement and the humanities. It is 
understandable why Derridian deconstruction, as set out in Di/ferance, would appeal to the 
more radical elements in the Women's Movement -- at least until it occurred to them that the 
sword that they employ against phallocratic language can turn against the hand that is wielding 
it. Similarly, it is understandable why Differance would appeal to historians, literary critics and 
to other humanists whom it releases from what seems to them a will-of-wisp pursuit of "the" 
meaning of some document or other. 
In a word, responses to Differance are strongly affected by differential evaluations of 
the objectivity, neutrality, and seriousness that, for centuries, have been thought to characterize 
the appropriate attitude to adopt in all cognitive enterprise, and more generally, by differential 
attitudes toward completion, closure, and risk-taking. Since there are many -- Westerners and 
non-Westerners -- who are mounting attacks on the status quo, and as many others who want to 
repulse them, it is not to be wondered at that opinion is bipolarized. 
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ENDNOTES 
I am deeply grateful to Steve Erickson, Paul Mann and Arden Reed for their detailed and 
thoughtful comments on successive drafts of this paper. 
1. For an example of a non-terminating disagreement resulting from differences in 
world view, see below, p. 00. 
2. Derrideans may object at this point, even before I have well begun, that in 
introducing the notion of differences in level I am casually taking for granted the 
distinction between surface and depth that Derrida has explicitly rejected, along with all 
other metaphysical dualities. Certainly there is much in this paper from which they 
will strongly dissent, but the distinction I am proposing here is not metaphysical; it is 
no more than the distinction between (1) what people say and (2) the unstated, and 
possible unconscious, intentions that lead them to say what they say; and this is a 
distinction that Derrida himself constantly makes use of -- for instance in his analysis, 
in The Truth in Painting, of Meyer Shapiro's paper on The Origin of the Work of Art --
I assume it is safe to make use of it in discussing one of Derrida's own papers. 
Exception will also certainly be taken to what will be seen as my purloining of 
Derrida's term "deconstruction" to designate the kind of analysis I shall be doing. In 
reply two comments. First, given Derrida's view of reference (see below, pp. 00), he is 
not justified in claiming even squatter's rights to any term, whatever that term may be. 
Second, there is an important (from my point of view) family resemblance between 
Derridean deconstruction and philosophical archaeology to which I want to call 
attention: Philosophical archaeology completes the process of deconstruction by showing 
why Derrida assembled the bits and pieces of other texts that together form the text of 
Differance in just the way he assembled them. 
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3. See, for instance, "Philosophical Archaeology: Below the Surface of Tragic Choices, 
Metaphilosophy, 19, pp. 313-328. 
4. Compare "The Ends of Man," a lecture Derrida gave in October, 1968. Given the 
extraordinary impact that the student/worker strikes in May of that year had on French 
intellectuals, and noting that Derrida has dated this paper "May 12, 1968," it is not 
implausible to conclude that, in Derrida's view, the second of the two possible strategies 
he discussed at the end of the paper ("to decide to change terrain, in a discontinuous 
and disruptive fashion, by brutally placing oneself outside, and by affirming an absolute 
break and difference") had already been launched. 
5. It is possible not only to experience nostalgia for what has been lost -- the pre-
logocentric language of the early Greeks; it is also possible to experience longing for the 
unknown future, the language hinted at in The Ends of Man. And that Derrida did 
indeed experience this longing is suggested by his discussion of "Heideggerian hope" (see 
below, p. 00). 
6. Note the expressions "as a whole" and "in entirety." They reflect that influence on 
Derrida's thinking of the aU-or-none rule: either all is firm or nothing is. 
7. Derrida is thinking specifically of Levy-Strauss at this point, but Piaget would 
surely be another example. If so, we must add structuralism to platonism, cartesianism 
and logical positivism as a fourth move by foundationists to anchor "the field of the 
human sciences." 
8. There is a useful short discussion of this debate by Richard Rorty (in Contigency, 
Irony, and Solidarity, pp. 125, ff.), who comes down on firmly for a sharp 
disco n tin ui ty. 
